Multiple proposed determinants of the long-term historical shift in marriage preference from polygynous to monogamous unions are tested simultaneously using data on a worldwide sample of 186 pre-industrial societies. Since the diffusion of monogamy though conquest and population migration is well documented, we employ network autocorrelation regression models that include the cultural transmission of monogamy as an endogenous predictor variable. Linguistic and spatial transmission processes are found to be significant factors that jointly affect the world-wide variance of monogamy, while religious transmission processes are not significant, suggesting genomic variation may play a role in shaping the incidence of monogamy. Other significant factors are reduction of extrinsic risks due to pathogen stress and endemic violence, a highly articulated extrahousehold division of labor, and a beneficent environment, results which are consistent with female choice as a binding constraint in marriage decisions.
Introduction
Monogamous marriage is the human form of "social monogamy" among mammals and birds in which a male and a female form an exclusive pair, sharing resources and living relationships, but not always an exclusive sexual relationship (Reichard, 2003) . About 5 percent of all mammal species are monogamous; among primates the figure is 15 percent. Primate mating typically involves pair-bonding, which is not so common among other mammals (van Schaik & Dunbar, 1990) . Human pairbonds often involve romantic love (Jankowiak & Fischer, 1992) and can take on polyandrous, polygynous, or monogamous forms (Barrett, Dunbar, & Lycett, 2002) . Only about 1 percent of ethnographically known human societies permit polyandrous marriages, while 82 percent permit polygyny; the remaining 17 percent permit only an advantage where there is high risk of famine. Second, in environments with endemic violence, a larger household will be more able to defend itself from others. Third, where the second wife is unrelated to the first, the network of kin relations linking the household to the surrounding society expands, so that resources during periods of famine and allies during periods of strife are more easily obtained.
Illustrations of the fitness-enhancing nature of polygynous households are easily found in the ethnographic literature. Among the Ekiti Yoruba, for example, where women perform most of the work and where rights to land are based on the number of household members, adding a wife adds to the resource base of the household. The presence of a co-wife allows a woman to specialize in one of the traditional female tasks (farm labor, household labor, and trade), often the task that they themselves prefer. More co-wives mean more affinal kin, which widens the household's social network, providing allies in conflicts and making it possible for members to visit other villages without fear of violence. As sons mature, the household becomes increasingly secure from violence. The wives benefit from the greater security of the large household, not only in terms of reduced threats from violence, but also because the greater supply of food reduces the risk of famine, and the wide social network enables them to trade in villages which would otherwise be hostile. A co-wife allows a woman to escape sexual obligations when those are unwelcome, and facilitates involvement in extra-marital affairs. Overall, the Ekiti see life as easier in polygynous households, with more hands to perform necessary duties, and more time for leisure (Caldwell et al., 1991) .
Monogamy persists when females see no advantage in polygyny, and this is most likely where larger households have no fitness advantages: where extra-household economic specialization is so advanced that within-household specialization is of little consequence; where the state claims a monopoly on violence and is able to enforce peace; and where vast trade networks and state policies eliminate the threat of famine.
In summary, monogamy will be more prevalent in environments characterized by low risk of famine, low endemic violence, and a highly articulated extra-household division of labor. To test these ideas, we employ new scales for famine stress, violence stress, and the division of labor, though we recognize that another of our independent variable scales, beneficent environment, may capture the same variation in prevalence of monogamy as famine stress.
Male intra-sexual aggression. A male may directly control females, guarding them from other males (Emlen & Oring, 1977) . Mate guarding is in the interest of males due to the prolonged period of human infantile dependence, which requires high parental (including paternal) investment. Because of the very large investment, there are also very large gains from impregnating females whose offspring are cared for by others. Hence human males devote much of their reproductive effort to both mate guarding and cuckolding others (Hawkes et al., 1995) .
The difficulty of guarding more than one female may lead to the observed prevalence of monogamy, a pattern seen among birds (Hawkes et al., 1995; Reichard, 2003) . Among humans, mate guarding is often facilitated by social institutions: strict rules preventing the public interactions of men and women; settlement patterns keeping households isolated from each other; harsh sanctions on extramarital sex; gossip that makes privacy difficult; or the presence of a male's mother to keep watch on his spouse(s). Where such institutions are weak, or where the male/female sex ratio is high, mate guarding becomes more difficult, and monogamy should be more prevalent (Marlowe, 2000) .
Societies where males provide little food or direct care for children are often polygynous and it is often inferred that marriages in these societies are based primarily on mate-guarding (Marlowe, 2000; Quinlan & Quinlan, 2007b) , so that the marriage system is an expression of male preference, not female choice. That mate guarding may involve coercion, of females by males, is clearly seen in cases such as the marriage of women captured in war or the selling of girls into concubinage, and even the polygyny described by Betzig (1986) in hierarchical political systems. Nevertheless, polygyny is likely to be more common in settings where females find it in their own best interests. Even when females do not freely choose their own marriage partner and must follow the dictates of their parents or male kin, inclusive fitness would guide kin to make decisions that would favor the female's reproductive interests (Scheidel, 2008) . In her study of Kipsigis polygyny, Borgerhoff-Mulder (1990) finds little evidence that kin coerce females into unfavorable marriages.
A female would benefit from mate-guarding if outside males constituted a danger to her offspring. Protection from violent males intent on infanticide (van Schaik & Dunbar, 1990) , or attempting to steal food (Wrangham et al., 1999) , would be such a benefit. From the perspective of a female such protection would constitute a resourceand to the extent that that protection is a non-rivalrous good, it would facilitate polygyny. Thus, monogamy will be more likely when females have little need for defense from outside males.
To summarize: monogamy is expected to be more prevalent in societies with few social controls bolstering paternity certainty, where male-female sex ratios are high, and where the danger of violence is low. Consequently, we test these hypotheses by including in our regression model scales for social control and intra-societal violence stress, plus two variables (not scales) for relative female scarcity: male-female sex ratio, and male mortality in warfare.
Extrinsic risk. Extrinsic risk is risk that cannot easily be mitigated by parental investment-risk due to predators, pathogens, famine, and endemic violence. Low extrinsic risk environments should encourage parental investment, and one would expect to see stable pair bonds. Since male investment in offspring is higher per child under monogamy than polygyny, low extrinsic risk is often invoked as an explanation for the prevalence of monogamy (Del Giudice, 2009; Low, 2003; Quinlan, 2007; Quinlan & Quinlan 2007a) .
Human cultural institutions-including marriage institutions-evolve to reduce extrinsic risk. Humans need not respond to predators or violence by reducing parental investment; they can respond by organizing themselves to combat predators and hostile humans. Institutions such as food storage, irrigation, or trade can reduce the risk of famine. Cultural institutions adapting to pathogens include food preparation techniques (Sherman & Billing, 1999) , parenting styles (Quinlan, 2007) , marriage forms (Low 1988 (Low , 1990 , and even subtle attitudes toward strangers and deviants (Fincher et al., 2008) .
As noted in previous sections, extrinsic risk due to endemic violence and famine stress can be ameliorated through increases in intra-household labor specialization and the size of kin networks facilitated by polygynous marriages. However, in environments with high levels of pathogen stress male genetic quality is an especially important consideration (Low 1988 (Low , 1990 (Low , 2003 (Low , 2007 . Polygynous marriages not only make it possible for females to share high genetic quality husbands, but also facilitate female extramarital matings with males of the highest genetic quality, since males find it harder Determinants of monogamy to guard multiple wives.
2 Monogamy should therefore be more prevalent in environments with low pathogen stress; we test this hypothesis using a new scale of pathogen stress.
Group-level Processes
Collective action in small scale societies. There are three parties directly involved in the transformation of a monogamous marriage into a polygynous marriage: the original male-female dyad, and the prospective second wife. Beyond these three, there are two other types of interested parties: other males in the breeding population, and unmarried females in the breeding population. Unmarried females should generally support polygyny, since it would increase female relative scarcity and widen female choice in mate selection. Other males in the breeding population would, however, experience a loss in fitness, since a female gained by another male reduces their pool of potential mates; these males could potentially engage in collective action to enforce monogamy.
Coalitions to reduce the power of dominant males are characteristic not only of humans, but of our nearest relatives such as chimpanzees (Boehm, 1999) . Two reasons suggest that coalitions enforcing monogamy are unlikely to form, however. First, there is a free rider problem: Participating in the coalition is costly, in terms of time, effort, and danger, but all males would be able to enjoy the public good (increased availability of females) whether participating in the coalition or not. Hence all males would have an incentive to stay aloof, and the coalition would attract no members. Only in small groups, where free riders can be easily identified and punished, would coalitions emerge (Olson, 1971) . Second, the beneficiaries of a complete ban on polygyny would be a relatively restricted set of unmarried males and their close consanguineal kin. These would presumably be among the least influential members of a society. Coalitions would be much more likely to emerge to restrict the number of wives to a low number (three, for example), since the pool of potential beneficiaries would be much larger (men with fewer than three wives, and their close consanguineal kin). Thus one might expect collective action reducing the number of wives of dominant males, but only in small-scale societies and never a complete ban on polygyny. That is, collective action by less powerful males to reduce polygyny, and thus increase the prevalence of monogamy, is likely only in small scale societies. We test this hypothesis with our index for societal scale.
Socially imposed monogamy. A number of societies, particularly large industrial states, have socially imposed monogamy (SIM)-the prescription of monogamy as the sole marriage form. SIM was first discussed by Alexander et al. (1979) , who suggested that it had a functional source: Large states can only be stable if they successfully suppress the power of kin groups; the imposition of monogamy does exactly that, preventing the formation of lineages which might struggle for power within the state (Alexander et al., 1979) . Alexander (1987) also suggests that the imposition of monogamy directly reduces conflicts between males over access to females: "socially or legally imposed monogamy is a way of leveling the reproductive opportunities of men, thereby reducing their competitiveness and increasing their likelihood of cooperativeness" (p. 71). One can think of this as an elite concession view of monogamy, since elite males are sacrificing their ability to have multiple wives in order to secure the support of the male masses. Perhaps the best-known elite concession view of monogamy is that of Betzig (1986) , who points out that large industrialized states are successful to the extent that the masses possess specialized skills and knowledge. The need of the state for human capital gives masses bargaining power for income, political rights, and reproductive rights. Thus, large industrialized states impose monogamy-a restriction imposed on the elite, in the interests of the masses. The imposition of monogamy is likely to be accompanied by other concessions, such as increasingly broad-based political participation (Betzig, 1986; Kanazawa & Still 1999; MacDonald, 1990; Price, 1999) . The elite are motivated to make these concessions by their desire to strengthen the state when struggling for survival in war with other states (Alexander et al., 1979; Henrich et al., 2012) .
In summary, the prevalence of monogamy is likely to be higher in large scale societies where elites can impose social monogamy in order to control the power of extended kin groups. As with the hypotheses above about the effects of collective action, this hypothesis is also tested by including our index for societal scale. In addition, however, the prevalence of monogamy is expected to be higher in societies with other elite concessions, such as broad-based political participation, which we test using our scale for political participation.
Cultural trait transmission. The elite concession view has been criticized for ignoring the roots of SIM in the institutions of Greece, Rome, and medieval Christianity (Price, 1999) . MacDonald (1990) examines SIM and concludes that it is simply not adaptive. He attributes the imposition of monogamy in modern states to the chance conversion of Constantine to Christianity, and the subsequent diffusion of Christian rules of marriage throughout the Roman cultural region (Price, 1999) . Religion is a channel by which cultural transmission of monogamy takes place; all known cases of a society taking up SIM are cases of cultural transmission, not spontaneous adaptive development (Alexander et al., 1979; Herlihy, 1995; Scheidel, 2008) .
Modernization is a particularly important channel of cultural transmission (Divale & Seda, 2001) . The most successful European states conquered large areas of the Earth and reshaped local cultures in their own image. The few states that successfully avoided conquest voluntarily adopted traits of these successful states, in an effort to achieve their level of power. The traits were adopted wholesale, with little attempt to separate the traits conferring power from incidental traits. SIM can thus be introduced via modernization, even when monogamy confers no advantages to the society as a whole or to the elite directing modernization.
The effects of cultural transmission are partially tested by our modernization scale which combines six variables for modernization. We rely, however, on network variables, based on inter-society proximity matrices, in our regression models for our main measure of cultural transmission, along channels of religion, historical descent (linguistic phylogeny), and geographic diffusion.
It should be pointed out that our network variables cannot distinguish the effects of cultural transmission from the effects of gene transmission. In general, most evolutionary psychological research disregards the possibility that behavior across societies varies due to underlying genotypic variation. Instead, it is assumed that all humans have much the same evolved dispositions, that those dispositions include specific responses to specific environmental cues, and that variation in behavior is due to variation in the environments to which humans are responding (Tooby & Cosmides, 1992) . While this phenotypic plasticity would be especially adaptive in cases where the environment changes frequently, the selection of alleles favoring a particular marriage form might be expected when populations live a long time in a relatively unchanging environment (Penke, 2009) . For example, a harsh environment would require greater paternal provisioning (MacDonald, 2000 , Miller, 2000 , which would make monogamy more likely. One piece of evidence that such selection may have occurred is that sexual dimorphism is lower in populations with ecologically imposed monogamy (Alexander et al., 1979) . In addition, allele frequencies are similar in populations that are physically proximate (Barbujani et al., 1997) or speak a similar language (Cavalli Sforza et al., 1988) , a pattern that may mostly reflect demic expansion during the Neolithic, as described in Bellwood (2005) . Thus, any consideration of similarity in marriage practices between populations that are linguistically or physically proximate will unavoidably capture genomic similarities between those populations.
Method

Network Autocorrelation Regression
The interdependency among cross-cultural or cross-national survey sample units due to cultural trait transmission is widely referred to as Galton's Problem (Dow et al., 1984; Dow, 2007; Jahn, 2006) . Any process that is hypothesized to result in interdependencies among n sample units, such as societies or nations, can be represented as an n x n pairwise connectivity matrix, W. By far the most common connectivity matrix is based on some function of geographic distance. The usual underlying premise in this case is that close physical proximity promotes more frequent interaction between individuals, communities, or societies which in turn makes adoption of cultural traits by diffusion and borrowing among neighbors more likely. A similar premise underlies the use of language relations: Societies that are more closely related linguistically are more likely to have inherited similar trait complexes from a common ancestor. Other processes of cultural trait transmission can also be operationalized as a connectivity weights matrix: For example, the spread of monogamy through the extensive horizontal transmission of Christianity by conquest and subsequent population migration by European Christian nations (Herlihy, 1995; MacDonald, 1995) can be represented by a weight matrix based on similarity of religion. Dow (2007) recently proposed that Galton's Problem be formulated as a network autocorrelation effects regression model, where the autocorrelated dependent variable is included as an endogenous predictor variable. It is straightforward to extend the usual regression model to include an additional variable that incorporates the effects of trait transmission on the distribution of percentage of married females in monogamous marriages, the dependent variable (y) in our proposed model:
where ε is a n x 1 vector of normally distributed error terms with zero mean, X is a n x k matrix of exogenous variables, β is a k x 1 vector of regression coefficients, α is the intercept, and λ is the scalar network autocorrelation effect coefficient. The first independent variable on the right of the equals sign is the product of the square n x n trait transmission matrix W and the n x 1 vector of scores on the dependent y variable. Estimation of the network autocorrelation effects regression model in equation (1) is not straightforward, however. The Wy variable is endogenous by definition, that is, it is correlated with the error term ε, since in equation (1) y is expressed as a function of ε. Ordinary least squares (OLS) regression requires that all of the independent variables be uncorrelated with the errors, ε, otherwise all of the estimated regression coefficients will be biased. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimation procedures are commonly used to deal with endogenous predictor variables. The first step in the 2SLS estimation of equation (1) is to generate an estimate of Wy that is independent of the ε term. This can be done by regressing Wy on one or more "instrumental" variables, which are independent variables that predict Wy but are uncorrelated with ε. Kelejian and Prucha (1998) suggest WX as a suitable set of instrumental variables, so that the following equation is estimated at stage 1 using OLS :
Which allows computation of ŷ w , an exogenous predictor for Wy:
The vector of predicted scores is then entered into equation (1) and the following stage 2 equation is estimated, again using OLS regression:
The estimates from this second stage model permit valid inferences about the effect of trait diffusion net of the functional associations (assessed by the estimated λ and its associated significance level), and the functional associations net of diffusion (the estimated β coefficients and their significance levels).
It is straightforward to extend the 2SLS approach to handle multiple W matrices simultaneously. However, network matrices representing commonly posited diffusion processes can be highly correlated with each other in any particular study, thus the use of multiple matrices may result in problems of multicollinearity and disentangling their separate contributions may be difficult. Dow and Eff (2009a) suggest one approach to handling this problem: combine multiple matrices into a single W matrix as follows:
W DLR = πD * W Distance + πL * W Language + πR * W Religion , where πD + πL + πR = 1 and 0 ≤ πD, πL, πR ≤ 1 that is, each weight lies in the [0,1] interval, inclusive. In the example reported below, the three combination weights were varied in increments of .05 to yield 231 combined matrices, and the W DLR combination matrix that maximizes the R 2 for the second stage regression equation is selected as the "best" matrix.
For each of the following three autocorrelation W matrices used in the current study, the main diagonal elements are set equal to zero and each row is row-standardized to unity. Geographical Distance. We employ the distance W D matrix described in Dow and Eff (2009a) . The elements are the squared reciprocal of the distances,
2 , of the closest 25 neighbors j for each society i: all other distances are set to zero.
Language. We employ the language W L matrix discussed in detail in Eff (2008) ; each cell gives the proximity of the row society to the column society based on a language phylogeny for the SCCS societies. Each pairwise score is exponentiated to get the matrix weights, w ij = e -score(ij) . Religion. We employ the W R matrix that is based on a nine category World Religion variable coded for the SCCS as described in Dow and Eff (2008) . Again, each similarity score was exponentiated as before.
Multiple Imputation of Missing Data
Missing data is ubiquitous in cross-cultural and cross-national survey data sets, including the cross-cultural sample data that we employ, and it renders previous comparative research on marital institutions problematic for the following two reasons: 1) the usual default option of listwise deletion of all cases with missing data on any variable can lead to biased parameter estimates, inflated Type I errors, and distorted confidence intervals; and 2) statistical power may be significantly reduced if all cases missing any data are deleted from the analysis. Over the past two decades or so, however, statisticians dealing with missing data have developed Bayesian multiple imputation (MI) methods that generate consistent and efficient estimates (Rubin, 1987; Schaefer, 1997) .
The analyses presented below are based on m=60 fully imputed data sets. The network effects regression equation was then estimated on each of the 60 imputed data sets, which yielded sets of 60 estimates of the regression parameters, their standard deviations, and other statistics. These estimates were then combined to yield the final estimates using the rules described in Rubin (1987) . Detailed discussion of these rules and empirical examples using cross-cultural data are given in Dow and Eff (2009a; 2009b) and Eff and Dow (2009) . 3 3 MI procedures are now found in most of the easily available statistical software packages, including Stata and SAS. We employ the multivariate imputation by chained equations (MICE) approach available in R (Van Buuren & Oudshoorn, 2009) . It is important to note why MI is now the overwhelmingly preferred approach to dealing with missing data. The key point is that if there are variables in the data set that predict which cases are observed on the variable to be imputed, then the basic assumption underlying both listwise and pairwise deletion, that the data are missing completely at random, does not hold. Consequently, biased results will be generated using either approach. Dow and Eff (2009) note that for the SCCS and other cross-cultural data sets, there will almost certainly be auxiliary variables available, in addition to the variables in a statistical model, that are correlated with the observed/not observed values of a binary indicator variable corresponding to any variable to be imputed, as is true for the present study. Since correlated (not necessarily causal) variables can be used as predictors of missing cases, both listwise and pairwise deletion will seldom be appropriate for cross-cultural survey research. This, in turn, makes MI crucial in order to adjust the biases that result from inappropriate deletion strategies that have been employed in virtually all empirical cross-cultural research to date. Rather than trying to recapture missing values through some kind of statistical alchemy, then, the fundamental goal of the MI procedure is to obtain consistent and efficient parameter estimates of the substantive statistical model of interest, that is, its coefficients and variances and associated p-values. In short, Some statisticians have suggested that only the cases that have observed values on the dependent variable be used to calculate the point estimates using the m fully imputed data sets. Von Hippel (2007) shows that using cases with imputed values for the dependent variable can introduce error into the final variance estimates that can be avoided if these cases are deleted. The estimates reported in the tables shown below are based only on observed dependent variable cases.
Exogenous Variables and Scale Construction
Cross-cultural researchers often combine several variables into a composite index or scale. Scales created by summing component variables (e.g., Divale & Seda, 2000; Low, 1988; Murdock & Provost, 1971) , or by factor analysis (Divale & Seda, 1999) are all examples of composite scales, created by a weighted sum of component variables. A wide variety of methods exists for specifying the weights assigned to each component variable, although in most cases there is no a priori reason to choose one weighting scheme over another. The choice of weights can therefore often be criticized as arbitrary. We use the linear programming method proposed by Eff (2010) in order to reduce the effect of weight choice. The method is based upon tiered data envelopment analysis (Barr et al., 2000) and separates societies into groups, such that the between-group differences in index rank are based on data values, not on weights. Figure 1 shows the distribution of monogamous marriages across the SCCS societies based on variable 872. The boxplot on the top left shows the U-shaped frequency of monogamy across political complexity: high among non-hierarchical societies, lower among chiefdoms and smaller states, and high again among the largest states (Marlowe, 2000) . The next two scatterplots plot the percent of marriages that are monogamous against the female contribution to subsistence (variable 826) and pathogen stress (variable 1260), respectively. The dashed line is the LOWESS smoother (Cleveland, 1979) , which shows clearly that monogamy declines as these two variables increase. The two boxplots on the right show how the frequency of monogamous marriages varies within language phyla and religions, respectively-an indication of the importance of cultural transmission, also indicated by the map. The values on the map are smoothed, using the local G* statistic (Getis & Ord, 1992) . appropriate use of MI will produce estimates with less bias and more power than listwise or pairwise deletion when using comparative data. (Getis and Ord 1992) . The boxplot at the upper left shows the U-shaped distribution of monogamy across political complexity. The scatterplots show the relationships between monogamy and female contribution to subsistence and pathogen stress, respectively; the dotted line is the lowess smoother (Cleveland 1979) . The boxplots at the right show the range of monogamous marriages across language phyla and religions, respectively. Table 1 shows the variables that were combined into the scales that we employ in our regression model, plus our dependent variable. Most are drawn from the SCCS. Prior to being combined into scales, each variable has missing values imputed using the auxiliary data set described in Eff and Dow (2009) as well as closely related SCCS variables. We generated eleven scales to operationalize the key concepts in our theoretical discussion. 4 Three are measures of extrinsic risk: violstr, which combines eight variables related to endemic within-society violence 5 ; path, which combines seven variables measuring the severity of risk from pathogens; and famstr, which combines 12 variables related to famine. Our discussion above suggests that higher values of these variables should all reduce the incidence of monogamy. The 14-variable scale benenv measures the degree to which the environment is beneficent, in that higher values are associated with less variation in annual and diurnal temperature, more precipitation, higher net primary production, and land more suitable for agriculture. This scale is intended as a test of Alexander et al.'s (1979) "ecologically imposed monogamy" hypothesis-that in harsh environments monogamy prevails because no man can afford to maintain more than one wife-but it can also be interpreted as an inverse measure of extrinsic risk.
Data
The scale femecon combines six variables to measure the economic importance of females, while resinq uses eight variables to produce a measure of resource inequality. Higher values of either of these should make monogamy less likely. The scale socont combines five variables to measure the degree to which extramarital affairs face sanctions; high values should indicate that paternity certainty is higher, making polygyny more feasible for males.
Combining seven variables, the scale polpart measures the degree to which there is broad political participation, which should coexist with SIM if the mechanism is one of elite concession. Measuring the degree of economic specialization, divlab combines nine variables. A society with a fine-grained division of labor should be more likely to have enforced SIM, and it should also be one in which females see no economic advantages in joining a large polygynous household. The scale socscale combines four variables to give 4 The LP scaling method used here is not based on shared-variance and can be used to create indices even when the component variables are only weakly correlated with each other. It is of interest, though, to see how well each set of variables would fit together using a shared-variance technique. The table in Appendix A reports the results of comparing the LP scales with the first principal component of each set of variables. In all but one case (femecon), the correlation between the LP scale and the first principal component is comfortably high; in all but three cases (modern, socont, and femecon), the Cronbach's alpha satisfies the rule of thumb threshold (≈ 0.7) typically used when selecting variables for factor analysis. See Appendix A for LP scale summary measures. 5 One anonymous reviewer asked why suicide was included in our violence stress scale. Ember and Ember (1992) coded the suicide variable as one of five variables in their "individual aggression" scale for the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample societies, and all five variables are included in our in our violence stress scale. We also included an additional three variables coded under "socially organized aggression," since our new scale is intended to assess overall stress levels stemming from endemic intra-society violence, either individual or social. Although our LP scaling method does not rely on inter-correlations of constituent items, it is worth noting here that the suicide variable is positively correlated with each of the other variables, and that the correlation of the suicide variable with our LP violence stress scale (r = 0.43) is very close to the average of the correlations of the other seven variables with the LP scale (r ave = 0.47). -4; (inv) indicates that the variable is multiplied by negative one prior to the standardization used in creating the LP scale. Sources: (a) GIS data from Hijmans, et al. (2005) ; (b) data kindly shared by authors of Ember et al. (2007) ; (c) GIS data from Imhoff et al. (2004) ; all other variables are found in the SCCS.
a sense of the size/political complexity of the society, allowing a test of Alexander et al.'s (1979) hypothesis that large-scale societies diminish the importance of lineages by prohibiting polygyny, as well as a test of the contradictory notion that collective action reducing polygyny is more likely to occur in small-scale societies. Cultural transmission is partly measured by the scale modern which combines six variables for modernization. We rely, however, on the network transmission coefficients for our main measures of cultural transmission, along channels of religion, historical descent (linguistic phylogeny), and geographic diffusion; implicitly, genomic effects will be captured by these terms.
Two variables (not scales) measure the relative scarcity of females: sexrto is the male:female sex ratio, and mmort is male mortality in warfare. As sexrto increases or mmort decreases, monogamy should be more likely.
Our dependent variable is the negative of the natural log of one plus the percentage of married women in polygynous marriages, that is, -ln(1+fpolym). This transformed variable will vary directly with the frequency of married women in monogamous marriages in the society. 6 As mentioned above, current best practice in multiple imputation is to drop all cases for which the dependent variable score is missing. For the current dependent variable, 43 of the 186 societies were dropped from the final regression analyses, although they were used when generating our 60 imputed data sets.
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Results Table 2 reports results for four 2SLS network autocorrelation effects regressions. The top panel reports standardized coefficients and stars for significance levels for the unrestricted model (using the heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors, based on the appropriate residuals for two-stage least squares). The first three columns of coefficients give the results for regression models that include a single lagged dependent variable for each of the religion, language and distance weights matrices, plus all eleven scales and the two individual variables. 8 The fourth column shows the results from a regression that includes a "best" composite weights matrix that is a weighted sum of these three weights matrices, where the final weights give the maximum possible regression R 2 , as described above.
The first row of standardized coefficients in Table 2 shows that the monogamy diffusion variables are highly significant for the language (0.294) and distance (0.296) weights matrices, but non-significant for the religion weight matrix (0.130); when all three matrices were combined into a composite network (0.321), the composite weights were: religion = 0, language = 0.5, and distance = 0.5. Taken together, these results clearly show that cultural trait transmission operates jointly through channels of descent (language) and spatial diffusion (distance). Religion does not present an independent channel, and there is only weak evidence for the influence of modernization. It is noteworthy that the two channels that transmit monogamy are those most likely to transmit genes, in addition to culture. We use a Wald test to check on the propriety of dropping non-significant independent variables (though retaining the trait transmission variable in all cases); the resulting restricted models are reported in the second panel of Table 2 . The bottom panel of Table 2 reports p-values from various diagnostic tests for these restricted models. 9 6 Adding 1 shifts the range of percentage married females in polygynous marriages (fpolym) from 0-97 to 1-98, so that logs can be taken; the log transformation reduces the effect of the variable's skewed distribution on estimation and inference; taking the negative allows us to interpret the regression coefficients as affecting the percentage of married females in monogamous marriages. 7 See Appendix B for information on the 43 societies that were dropped and the 143 that were retained; the retained cases, in our judgment, adequately cover the full spectrum of SCCS societies. 8 The term network lag is commonly used for the endogenous network diffusion variables, since they are analogous to lagged variables in time-series models, but are instead lagged in geographic, linguistic, religious, or other kinds of conceptual "space." The model containing the religion trait transmission term is poorly specified, failing five of the tests, and the religion trait transmission coefficient is itself insignificant. All models have heteroskedastic errors, which required the use of heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors for the coefficients in Tables 2 and 3 . Five independent variables are significant in at least one of the four restricted models. Three of these have some relation to extrinsic risk: violstr, path, and benenv. The fourth is a scale measuring female economic importance (femecon); and the last is the scale for the society-level division of labor (divlab). Overall, extrinsic risk is the strongest determinant of monogamy; pathogen risk exerting the strongest effect, followed by risk due to endemic violence, and then (much more weakly) risk due to harsh environment.
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Discussion
Much of the theoretical work on human monogamy has stressed the role of male resources in framing female choice for monogamy or polygyny. One insight from that work is that monogamy should be more prevalent where male resource endowments are less variable. We find no evidence to support this: the estimated coefficients for resinq (resource inequality) are not only non-significant, but of the wrong sign in our unrestricted models. We used the scale benenv (beneficent natural environment) to test Alexander et al.'s (1979) hypothesis that monogamy is sometimes the product of environments so harsh that males cannot gain the resources to support more than one wife. In this case, the coefficients were significant and of the wrong sign, suggesting that monogamy is more common in resource-abundant environments. We also suggested that monogamy would be more often chosen in societies where male resources are important in household production. Our variable femecon (female economic importance) provides weak evidence that this is indeed the case, though it fails to be significant in our preferred composite model. Taken together, these results suggest that male resources are not an important determinant of female choice between monogamy and polygyny.
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Polygyny based on a female's attraction to a male's resources would always involve a conflict of interest between the first wife and any subsequent wife, since the first wife would see her share diminished by a co-wife. Hence it is not surprising that male resources cannot explain the prevalence of polygyny. Polygyny would be more prevalent in conditions where the first wife finds herself better off by the addition of the co-wife, such as the conditions faced by the Ekiti Yoruba, discussed above: householdlevel production, high levels of endemic violence, and kin-based alliance and exchange networks.
Wherever production is carried out primarily at the household level, large polygynous households provide fitness advantages in two ways: first, they allow more scope for specialization, and hence higher productivity; and second, they contain more kin ties to other households, which would increase access to resources. We reasoned, then, that monogamy should be more likely where a well-developed extra-household division of labor diminishes the usefulness of within-household specialization and kinbased exchange networks. The positive and significant coefficient for divlab (division of labor) shows that monogamy is indeed more likely in societies with a fine-grained division of labor.
The fitness advantages of a large polygynous household would be particularly valuable in environments characterized by chronic famine, which suggests that monogamy should be more prevalent where food is relatively abundant. Our scale famstr (famine stress), though of the expected negative sign, fails to be significant. However, the scale benenv (beneficent natural environment), which can be interpreted as an inverse measure of famine risk, is positive and significant, which provides some support to the notion that monogamy is more likely where the food supply is more secure.
A large polygynous household also provides fitness advantages against violence: a large number of sons, plus a wide kin network of potential allies, serve to shield its members from danger. Thus, monogamy should be more prevalent in societies with lower levels of endemic violence. Our results confirm this: The highly significant negative coefficient for violstr provides strong evidence that monogamy is more likely where peace prevails, as where states claim a monopoly on violence.
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Our results are thus strongly supportive of the view that monogamy will emerge when it is in the interest of individual agents, and that the key decider is the first wife-if she sees no advantage in a co-wife, then monogamy is the outcome.
Females may choose polygyny not only to gain access to the greater resources of the polygynous household, but also to gain access to the genes of high quality males. Male genetic quality is particularly critical for offspring fitness in environments with high pathogen stress (Low 1988 (Low , 1990 , allowing us to test this hypothesis with the independent variable path. Our results show that pathogen stress strongly conditions the choice between polygyny and monogamy. While this provides additional confirmation of the importance of female choice, it is not primarily the choice of the first wife, but of all wives.
We considered that monogamy may also be the result of males choosing to have only one wife, because of the difficulty of guarding more than one. We reasoned that guarding would be difficult (and monogamy more prevalent) in societies with few social controls bolstering paternity certainty, and in societies with high male to female ratios. We tested this with the variables socont (social controls), mmort (male mortality) and sexrto (sex ratio), and all regression coefficients were insignificant in the unrestricted models and of the wrong sign. These results suggest that male choice is not an important determinant of monogamy.
We also considered that the choice for monogamy could be made by actors other than those directly involved in the marriage: It could be imposed by collective action of unmarried males, or imposed by an elite. We reasoned that the free-rider problem would make collective action unlikely except in small-scale societies, but our variable socscale indicates that the scale of the society does not condition the choice for monogamy. The lack of effect also provides some evidence against elite imposition of monogamy, which is expected only in large-scale societies, in order to nullify the power of kin groups (Alexander et al., 1979) . Elite imposition of monogamy is expected to covary with other elite concessions, such as broad political participation. The insignificance of the variable polpart further suggests that monogamy does not emerge through a top-down approach, in which an elite decides for an entire society.
The single most important determinant of monogamy in our analyses is cultural trait transmission. Societies practicing monogamy may adopt the trait from neighboring groups, or it may be part of a heritage acquired from ancestral cultures. Our network effects regression results provide the first statistical evidence that the joint effects of horizontal diffusion, as indicated by spatial relationships, and vertical diffusion, as indicated by language relationships, are important factors in bringing about the observed pattern of monogamy in the preindustrial world.
Somewhat surprisingly, there are no effects attributable to diffusion of religious beliefs. The lack of effects is not simply due to collinearity with other forms of cultural trait transmission, since religious effects are absent even in the model without spatial and linguistic effects (Table 2, column headed "Religion"). Our results show that the transmission channel of religion explains nothing about the prevalence of monogamy, once our scales are included in the model. This suggests that the Christian version of SIM must have spread into locales already primed for monogamy, due to state suppression of violence, relatively low pathogen load, and high degree of extra-household division of labor-conditions which may have characterized Constantine's empire. On the other hand, where violence is endemic, pathogen stress high, and households directly produce for themselves, one would not expect the introduction of Christianity to lead to SIM-a situation seen in parts of sub-Saharan Africa, for example.
In fact, the results are supportive of a "materialist" perspective: religious ideas are adopted as projections of and justifications for social relations, but the actual determinants of those social relations come not from the ideological superstructure, but from technology and the physical environment. Since the sole insignificant transmission channel is one that transmits culture but much less frequently genes, there may be some genomic role in the incidence of monogamy, and our joint trait transmission variable may reflect genomic effects.
Conclusions
Our empirical results provide support for two different views of the prevalence of monogamy in human societies. The first is that monogamy is not imposed by an elite seeking to increase the stability and survivability of the society (i.e., not cultural group selection as suggested by Henrich et al., 2012) , but rather appears as an adaptation chosen by individuals striving to increase their own fitness. The key decision makers in choosing monogamy are women, since male fitness can in most circumstances be enhanced by polygyny. Women will see no advantage in polygyny when: 1) there exists such a finegrained extra-household division of labor that increasing within-household specialization brings no advantages; and 2) a large household brings no advantages in shielding members from endemic violence. Both of these conditions will be met in societies with a high degree of role specialization and functions for policing and justice administration, which helps to explain the observed prevalence of monogamy in contemporary large industrialized states.
The natural environment also frames female choice for monogamy. Most importantly, in an environment of low risk of pathogen infection women are less motivated to mate with men of the highest genetic quality, and are therefore less inclined to share men in polygynous marriages. In addition, areas with a beneficent climate will have a higher incidence of monogamy, presumably because there is less need for protection from famine provided by the relatively diverse production of a polygynous household.
The second view supported by our results is that monogamy has spread through borrowing and descent, so that societies that practice monogamy do so because ancestral and neighboring societies do so-not because the practice is necessarily adaptive. The joint channels of transmission are language phylogeny (common descent) and geographic (diffusion from neighbors)-but not religion. Interestingly, the two active channels are those that commonly transmit genes in addition to culture, leaving open the possibility that inter-societal differences in marriage practices may be partially conditioned by genotypic differences. The first column gives the percent of the total variation explained by the first principal component of the set of variables used to create the scale. The second column gives the Cronbach alpha for each set of variables, and the last column gives the Pearson correlation between the LP scale and the first principal component. All values are averages over the 60 imputations.
